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Conservatism, Social Isolation and Political Context:  
Why East Europeans Would Leave the EU 
 
 




The British decision to leave the EU after the 2016 referendum raises questions about who could 
be next. This article analyzes why citizens in East European Member States would vote to leave 
the EU in case of a referendum. It proposes an analytical framework that seeks to explain this 
strong form of Euroscepticism through four variables that are rarely linked to the EU: political 
apathy and alienation, dissatisfaction with domestic democracy and economy, conservative 
values, and social isolation. We use individual level data from the 2018 wave of the European 
Social Survey to show that that citizens’ conservative attitudes and social isolation are robust 
determinants of a potential EU exit vote in Eastern Europe. We also identify several country-
specific causes, which means that the EU faces specific challenges across political settings. 
 





The post-communist countries in Eastern Europe joined the European Union (EU) in an attempt 
to consolidate their democracies, develop their economies and solve social problems. The pre-
accession conditionality ticked many of these boxes and led to extensive support for European 
integration among domestic political elites and the public in many countries. However, the post-
accession period marks the rise of secessionist tendencies, poor consolidation of agreed reforms, 
security threats, social cleavages, enhanced national identities, tensions between national and 
European policies, or democratic backsliding. Several forms of Euroscepticism that emerged prior 
 
to the accession of many East European countries continue to be visible over time and contribute 
to the contestation of the European project today. 
 Leaving the EU is a specific and very strong form of Euroscepticism. The 2016 Brexit 
referendum led to a short-term increase in the confidence of Eurosceptic actors in several EU 
member states. A few days after the Brexit referendum, the populist radical right Party for 
Freedom in the Netherlands called for a Dutch EU Membership referendum. Around the same 
time, the Czech president mentioned the possibility to initiate a Czexit referendum. The medium-
term effect was mainly in the opposite direction: the Eurosceptic discourses grew moderate and 
the politicians no longer called for a withdrawal from the EU. One exception to this occurred in 
Poland where the idea of Polexit emerged in the fall of 2021 after the EU openly criticized the 
Polish court ruling against the EU legal supremacy. All these reflect how politicians express this 
specific form of Euroscepticism, but we know little about what the people believe about it. 
Understanding which segments of society would agree with such discourse is important because 
it indicates which groups may eventually support withdrawal from the EU if the opportunity 
arises.  Moreover, this could empirically inform our knowledge of individuals rejecting both the 
ideas of European integration and the general practice of integration, i.e. the “Eurorejects” 
(Kopecký and Mudde, 2002) in the new Member States.  
 This article addresses this research gap and analyzes what can trigger this strong form of 
hard Euroscepticism in Eastern Europe. We seek to explain why citizens in 10 East European 
Member States would vote to leave the EU in case of a referendum. Our analysis focuses on this 
region due to the similarities between these countries in terms of previous authoritarian regime 
and moment of accession, as well as contradictory trends observable around the accession and 
in the post-accession period. Around the time of accession both political elites and citizens were 
predominantly enthusiastic due to the envisaged benefits of membership (Tverdova and 
Anderson, 2004). However, during the post-accession period, several governments became 
increasingly critical toward the EU and adopted strong Eurosceptic stances or political reforms 
that challenged European norms (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2020). We use individual level 
data from the 9th wave of the European Social Survey (2018), which includes 10 out of the 11 East 
 
European countries that are EU members. The analysis takes place in two steps: one comparative 
analysis including the respondents from 10 countries, followed by a comparison of three 
countries that display different attitudes toward the EU: Bulgaria, Czechia and Hungary. Case 
selection is further explained in the data and methods section. 
This specific and strong form of Euroscepticism rests on the concept of “Eurorejects”, 
which includes people with neither diffuse nor specific support for European integration 
(Kopecký and Mudde, 2002, pp. 300–301). We focus on this specific form of Euroscepticism which 
includes an implicit behavioral component in addition to attitudes of rejection. People may have 
the opportunity – which has gained credibility following Brexit – to decide in a potential 
referendum the fate of their country’s EU membership. The analytical framework used to explain 
this specific form of Euroscepticism goes beyond common indicators such as EU attachment, 
attitudes toward European unification, or trust in European institutions. Our analysis controls for 
these to ensure the robustness of results, but we believe there are particular reasons linked to 
everyday life and domestic politics that could drive citizens in this direction. We argue and test 
the explanatory power of four main categories of determinants: political apathy and alienation, 
dissatisfaction with domestic democracy and economy, conservative values and social isolation.  
We contribute to the literature in two ways. First, we show how several variables that are 
not directly related to the EU may explain this strong form of Euroscepticism. Some of these, such 
as attitudes toward migrants, were included in research on Brexit voting. However, others such 
as political alienation, dissatisfaction or social isolation of individuals have not been explored so 
far in direct relation to Euroscepticism; one important exception to this rule is the study of Fox 
(2021) who links political alienation and the support for Brexit. By focusing on these overlooked 
attitudes, we unfold a broader web of political attitudes and social behaviors. Second, this is the 
first comparative study that moves beyond the over-explored single-case study of Britain to 
explain a potential EU exit vote. We test empirically the sources of this specific type of behavior 
that complements the traditional understanding of Euroscepticism.  
The following section reviews the literature and presents the analytical framework 
proposed by this article. Next, we discuss the research design with emphasis on the case 
 
selection, data and variable operationalization. The third section includes the analysis and 
interpretation of results. The conclusions summarize the key findings and discuss the main 
implications for the broader field of study.  
 
An Analytical Framework  
The existing literature explains the specific and strong form of Euroscepticism investigated here 
– the vote to leave the EU – through determinants such as national identity, ideological 
orientation, the degree of openness toward multiculturalism and modernization. These focus on 
the materialization of Brexit and the UK’s Eurosceptic stance. They conclude that Brexit was a 
vote against the EU, globalization, integration and multiculturalism (Outhwaite, 2017). The UK 
has a different cultural identity from the rest of Europe, it is exclusive and profoundly 
nationalistic. The rise of Eurosceptic parties enforced the idea that European integration affected 
national sovereignty, self-determination of the state and produces threats for the British society 
(Schimmelfennig, 2018). The fear of losing its cultural identity and its resistence to relinquish 
powers to European institutions favored a British leave vote (Schimmelfennig, 2018). Some 
studies illustrate that support for Brexit was high among those who were dissatisfied with their 
social and economic status, had lower-income, lacked professional skills, opposed immigrants 
and perceived them as competitors on the job market, had lower levels of education and had 
conservative values (Carl, Dennison and Evans, 2018). There is also research showing that 
Brexiters are not confined to societal drop offs but also include middle-class individuals with 
declining financial situations (Antonucci et al., 2017). 
There are two main shortcomings with these approaches. First, they are case specific and 
cover extensively Euroscepticism or national identity, which may not be as prominent in other 
countries as in the UK. Second, several determinants have been studied in isolation and do not 
provide a comprehensive and broadly applicable framework for analysis. Moreover, other factors 
could also play a relevant role in voters’ decision to leave the EU in addition to what is presented.  
To address these shortcomings, we propose an analytical framework with several 
determinants. Our argument is that the desire to leave the EU is a function of several 
 
characteristics linked to the political, economic and social life of individuals. It is rooted in the 
apathy, alienation and dissatisfaction in citizens with what they have in their countries in terms 
of politics and economics (H1-H4). In line with earlier studies, we argue that voters with 
conservative values are against the EU (H5-H6), but we also contend that those individuals who 
feel socially isolated may also wish to leave the Union (H7-H8). Our approach is consistent with 
earlier studies that discuss how public opinion toward the EU can be shaped by the 
interconnections between the European and the national levels (Anderson, 1998). Each of these 
determinants is covered in detail in the following sub-sections.  
 
Political apathy and alienation 
Our first argument is that political apathy and alienation can favor a leave vote. This happens 
either because people do not care about the existing political setting or because they see 
themselves powerless in the decision-making process. Political apathy and alienation can be 
related, but earlier research indicates that the major difference between the two is the level of 
cognitive awareness. Apathetic individuals have low cognitive awareness and they have  
sufficient knowledge about politics yet decide that they are not concerned. Alienated individuals 
have higher cognitive awareness and they know the source of alienation (Fox, 2015). Political 
apathy is an attitudinal orientation characterized by a lack of desire or motive to take an interest 
in politics (Rosenberg, 1954; Dahl et al., 2018). Unlike other works that define apathy relative to 
political participation (de Luca, 1995), this approach allows us to identify behavioral 
consequences of an indifferent stance toward politics. Apathy can result in lower levels of 
political participation overall but could also result in casting a particular type of vote when people 
are exposed to a salient issue. We argue that people who lack interest in politics are not aware 
of the benefits EU membership brings to their country. Extensive research documents the 
positive effects of EU membership and the Europeanization process in post-communist Europe. 
These effects can be observed for a broad range of polity issues such as the rule of law, 
improvement of administrative capacity or political institution reform (Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier, 2005). However, individuals with little interest in politics are unlikely to be aware 
 
that the EU is the source of such positive developments. To them, the benefits of membership 
may not be obvious and they may be more inclined to cast a leave vote in a potential referendum.  
Political alienation is traditionally associated with the rejection of everything that comes 
from politics (e.g. values, politicians, institutions); a sense of powerlessness and negativity in 
individuals. It is usually motivated by the government’s performance, corruption, manipulation 
and the belief that the enacted policies favor only specific groups (Citrin et al., 1975). Alienated 
individuals believe that they cannot make a difference in politics and are insignificant when it 
comes to influencing social dynamics. They perceive politics as being senseless, unfair and are 
unable to identify  with any of the existing norms and policies (Finifter, 1970). Alienation is often 
motivated by specific political expectations and social discontent. For instance, younger 
generations tend feel alienatated when they are dissatisfied with how governmental policies and 
social evolution takes place, while older generations point to poor law enforcement and 
increased criminality as the main sources of their uneasiness and social discontent (House and 
Mason, 1975). Both categories are inclined to withdraw when their expectations are not met by 
the governments, they feel that their interests are not represented and they do not trust 
politicians (Bowler and Karp, 2004). 
Political alienation is a mix between powerlessness, lack of trust in the political system 
and lower socioeconomic status. Alienated individuals are not usually well-informed regarding 
policies and political processes, make uninformed decisions when it comes to voting and are 
unwilling to live in specific social and political communities (Finifter, 1970; Citrin et al., 1975; Benz 
and Stutzer, 2004). Alienated individuals tend to take part in specific political actions (e.g. 
protests) to express their dissatisfaction and frustration about politics. Their actions are 
motivated by negative feelings and dissatisfaction with the existing order. They usually 
participate in electoral processes only to invalidate their votes or will take part to referendums 
and social protests to signal to the governments that they are not satisfied with how their 
interests are represented (Damore, Waters and Bowler, 2012). One key indicator of political 
alienation is powerlessness, which is traditionally reflected in the belief that ordinary people 
cannot influence politics. In our specific case, people with such perceptions may perceive the EU 
 
as being out of their reach; a political project that hardly listens to citizens’ voices. Their 
alienation may feed adversarial attitudes when having the opportunity to leave an institution 
over which they have little control. Following all these arguments, we hypothesize that a vote to 
exit the EU is favored by: 
 
H1: Low political interest 
H2: The belief that ordinary people cannot influence politics 
 
Satisfaction with democracy and the economy 
In Eastern Europe, the EU has been often associated with democracy and economic 
development. We argue that individuals who are unhappy about the democratic and economic 
developments in their countries are more likely to cast a leave vote. The new democracies 
continue to have problems that originate in their authoritarian past such as corruption, misuse 
of authority, manipulation of electoral processes or political rights and civil liberties violations 
(Dahlberg, Linde and Holmberg, 2015). The dissatisfaction toward politics gives birth to a specific 
group of citizens, i.e. critical citizens or dissatisfied democrats. They support the values of 
democracies but are dissatisfied with how democracy works in their countries (Norris, 2011). 
Unlike those who are alienated, the dissatisfied citizens may improve the quality of democracy 
through particular forms of political participation (Webb, 2013).  
The dissatisfied democrats may wish to do something to change the situation and, in our 
specific case, this can be a vote to leave the EU. The pre-accession conditionality brought relevant 
democratic developments through the Copenhagen criteria and the EU was often regarded as an 
alternative to the poor performing and corrupt domestic elites. Nevertheless, many new joiners 
struggle with the quality of democracy after accession, with several recent examples of 
democratic backsliding. The direct benefits of EU membership for democracy consolidation are 
not always perceived. The challenges faced by the EU in the last decade (e.g. Eurozone, refugees, 
Brexit) have weakened citizens’ confidence in the EU’s ability to promote democracy in Member 
States. In addition, European integration takes time and there are countries that are still 
 
monitored for their progress well after accession. For example, the Mechanism for Cooperation 
and Verification is still active in Romania and Bulgaria 13 years after joining the EU. Yet, the EU 
still has not provided feasible solutions to address rule of law and corruption problems that 
plague the two countries. As a result of these developments, those who are dissatisfied with how 
democracy works in their country may stop perceiving the EU as a remedy  and begin to mistrust 
EU institutions (Dahlberg, Linde and Holmberg, 2015). 
Individual satisfaction with economic development may lead to a similar attitude. The 
basic principle was provided roughly four decades ago: When people perceive the government 
as capable of meeting their economic expectations and providing working opportunities, they 
are more likely to support it (Feldman, 1982). Conversely, when the political system is corrupt 
and there are high levels of unemployment, economic instability and the citizen welfare is 
threatened, support for the political system decreases (Feldman, 1982). The unequal distribution 
of economic resources, the overall economic development of the country and the cleavages 
between politicians and individuals enhance dissatisfaction with the regime and the public starts 
to perceive the existing order as unable to fulfill its expectations (Solt, 2008). In Eastern Europe, 
economic development is an important predictor of vote choice. For many citizens in the region, 
the EU has long been associated with economic prosperity mainly due to the rapid economic 
development of countries following accession. As soon as satisfaction with this development 
vanishes, the EU may not be seen as the same source of prosperity. Consequently, we expect 
that a vote to exit the EU may be positively influenced by:  
 
H3: Dissatisfaction with the way democracy works in the country 
H4: Dissatisfaction with the way economy works in the country 
 
Conservative values 
The conservative values of East Europeans may create a desire to leave the EU. We argue that 
this happens because such values are in contrast with the equality and inclusiveness promoted 
at the EU level. Individuals and societies aim to achieve certain goals in hierarchic order; when 
 
they achieve one target, they move to another (Inglehart, 1971). The process of setting and 
reaching a target could be ascribed to the modernization of societies. Modernization was initially 
considered a feature of Western societies, while Eastern societies were perceived as more 
conservative and closed because of their communist regimes. Since economic development and 
individuals’ welfare is closely connected to political and cultural values, Western societies 
achieved their economic objectives more rapidly and moved forward to other aims compared to 
Eastern Europe (Inglehart, 1971). Modern societies moved on to post-materialist aims (e.g. trust 
into authorities, welfare, tolerance for minorities), while those still under the process of 
modernization are more conservative, influenced by traditional institutions, religious authorities 
and lack economic development (Inglehart and Baker, 2000). 
The conservative values of citizens may clash with what the EU promotes mainly in terms 
of accepting diversity. Two groups that are subject to this are migrants and sexual minorities. 
Regarding migrants, as with many countries in the EU, populations have aged which has led to a 
reduction in the workforce. Since life expectancy is high and the socio-economic systems are 
developed, the EU is one of the favorite destinations for migrants (Sides and Citrin, 2007; Grande, 
Schwarzbözl and Fatke, 2019). The level of acceptance and integration of the immigrants in 
European societies is related to the discussion regarding the winners and losers of globalization. 
The winners are more likely to accept and integrate the immigrants in their societies. The losers 
are inclined to reject them and perceive the immigrants as a threat to national security (Sides 
and Citrin, 2007). Individuals who have lower-income, lack professional skills and are nationalistic 
may reject immigrants on the grounds that they steal their workplaces, exploit social and 
educational systems and alter their national identity by promoting their cultural particularities 
there (Sides and Citrin, 2007). Consequently, those who are against migrants are likely to oppose 
the EU, which uses an open-border approach in which migration has few limits. This idea is 
strengthened by the fact that migration was one of the key issues on the agenda of the Leave 
campaign in the UK during Brexit (Carl, Dennison and Evans, 2018).  
The lack of tolerance toward homosexuals is specific to conservative societies where 
religion and traditional values play a significant role in cultural and national identity, or social 
 
order (Adamczyk and Pitt, 2009). Although in the last decades countries from Western Europe 
have started to accept and integrate homosexuals in their societies, East European countries 
continue to oppose these dynamics. The latter are more conservative and religious, and they 
consider the acceptance of homosexuals’ rights to represent a threat to their cultural identity 
and national pride. In many of these countries, the right-wing politicians, members of the clergy 
and the media portray the EU as decadent and consider homosexual manifestations (e.g. 
marches, protests) as a threat to public morality (Abou-Chadi and Finnigan, 2018). One indication 
of the conservative attitudes toward the inclusiveness of sexual minorities among particular 
segments of society is the fact that in the most recent decade four East European Member States 
organized referendums against same-sex marriage. People with such attitudes are unlikely to 
favor a presence in the EU, where inclusiveness and equality are promoted. Consequently, we 
hypothesize that a vote to exit the EU may be favored by: 
 
H5: The belief that immigrants make the country a worse place to live in 
H6: The belief that gays and lesbians should not be free to live as they wish 
 
Social isolation 
Social isolation is often associated with loneliness, retreatment, lack of power, stigma and lack of 
desire or interest to take part in social activities (Warren, 1993). Despite their similarities, social 
isolation is different from political alienation because the former rejects social initiatives, working 
opportunities as well as the creation of social networks (Hortulanus, Machielse and Meeuwesen, 
2006). Socially isolated individuals are detached and disconnected from everything related to 
social life. Social isolation is usually ascribed to the lack of motivation or inability to take part in 
social events or actions. It is generated by the absence of reasons for involving in social activities 
and it is explained by the distance to the mainstream and social norms (Warren, 1993). Social 
isolation can be enhanced by the values and principles of Western societies. The economic and 
social development and the promotion of individualism have incentivized individuals to become 
less dependent on social communities and other members of society. Therefore, social isolation 
 
could be influenced by the desire to forego social involvement to achieve individual goals 
autonomously (Hortulanus, Machielse and Meeuwesen, 2006). Social isolation can be stimulated 
by poverty, social polarization or inequalities. Those who are dissatisfied with their social status 
and income are more likely to isolate themselves from others (Warren, 1993; Barry, 1998). 
Citizens play a relevant role in the stabilization of governance systems and the legitimacy 
of democracies (Welzel and Inglehart, 2008). The socially isolated individuals can hardly make a 
change in their societies because they refuse to create social networks and get involved in social 
activities. Socially isolated individuals can develop feelings that they are exploited by the 
majorities for specific purposes and fellow citizens or state authorities take advantages of them 
(Barry, 1998). They are dissatisfied with the existing order and believe that popular masses are 
manipulated by corrupt and untrustworthy politicians for their benefit (Hortulanus, Machielse 
and Meeuwesen, 2006). We argue that the fear of being manipulated and exploited by their 
communities, coupled with the absence of community-oriented behaviors, could influence 
socially isolated individuals to reject the EU. Such persons may perceive the EU as a 
supplementary source of manipulation. These arguments lead to the expectation that a vote to 
exit the EU is driven by: 
 
H7: A belief that most people try to take advantage of others 
H8: Low involvement in social activities with other people 
 
Control variables 
We test these main effects when controlling for four variables: three various gauging facets of 
Euroscepticism (EU attachment, European unification, and trust in the European Parliament) and 
education. The EU attachment is a set of values or a space that creates development 
opportunities for its members (Antonsich, 2008). Usually, individuals who are emotionally 
attached to a community are more likely to continue living in it. This is in line with the idea of 
favoring in-group characteristics and favoring membership to that group. A low EU attachment 
may thus favor leaving the EU. The European unification involves the creation of common 
 
institutions, policies and guidelines but implies also the transfer of national sovereignty and 
authority to European institutions (Alesina and Wacziarg, 1999). Increasing competencies and 
power of the European Parliament (EP) leads to a decrease in influence for the national 
parliaments. It is thus possible that attitudes toward the EP may influence an EU exit vote. 
Education is the final control variable because many studies indicate that it is positively 
associated with a pro-European stance (Kuhn and Stoeckel, 2014).1 
 
Data and methods 
This article uses individual-level data from the 9th wave of European Social Survey (2018). The 
survey uses probability representative samples at the national level, using a face-to-face data 
collection method. We focus on Eastern Europe for the reasons explained in the introduction. 
There is an important contrast between the convergence of elite and public support for the EU 
around the accession and the changing trends in the post-accession period. Some of the political 
elites changed their attitudes toward European integration, and the most recent decades 
provides several examples of government actions against the EU principles, practices and 
policies. The public in Eastern Europe continued to have more positive attitudes toward the EU 
compared with people from Western Europe during the financial crisis in the late 2000s (de Vries, 
2013). However, this changed slightly several years later when the critical attitudes of the elites 
were matched by the public in several Eastern Member States (Sanders and Toka, 2013). An 
illustration of this changing trend of attitudes toward the EU is reflected in the increasing vote 
share for hard Eurosceptic parties in most East European countries (de Vries, 2018).  
The analysis includes all East European Member States for which data is available in the 
2018 ESS survey: 10 out of 11 countries (Bulgaria, Croatia, Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia); Romania is the only one missing. The sample size varies 
 
1 Apart from the controls included in the analysis, we also tested for the effect of other variables that could have 
influenced an EU exit vote: national identity, trust in national institutions, party voted in national elections, income, 
left-right self-placement, age or gender. These variables either have no effect or they highly correlate with existing 
variables in the models. We do not report them to keep the statistical models parsimonious. 
 
between 918 (Latvia) and 2398 (Czechia). The analysis proceeds in two steps. First, we conduct a 
comparative analysis of all 10 countries to explain the likelihood to vote for an EU exit. Second, 
we compare the effects across three countries (Bulgaria, Czechia and Hungary) that belong to 
different categories in terms of their elite and population attitudes toward the EU. Bulgaria 
complies with the EU, has isolated anti-EU voices and has been one of the champions of EU 
support throughout the years. Czechia has traditionally contested the EU more than other 
countries in Eastern Europe and in recent times there are increasing anti-EU voices in domestic 
politics (de Vries, 2018). Hungary had and continues to have relatively high levels of support 
towards the EU within the population, but for roughly one decade the governing elites 
occasionally digressed from the path of Europeanization and have openly contested the EU 
(Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2020). The idea behind this case selection is to check the extent 
to which the effects hold in very different political settings.   
The dependent variable of this study is measured through the answers to the following 
question “Imagine there were a referendum in [country] tomorrow about membership of the 
European Union. Would you vote for [country] to remain a member of the European Union or to 
leave the European Union?”. The available answers were coded dichotomously as 0 for remain 
and 1 for leave. To make interpretation of results straightforward and to maintain consistency 
with the hypothesis wording, the independent variables were (re)coded from the highest to the 
lowest value (see Appendix 1). All “DK/NA” answers are treated as missing values and excluded 
from the analysis. We use binary logistic regression and we tested for multicollinearity. The 
results indicate no highly correlated predictors (the highest value is 0.37) and the values of the 
VIF test for multicollinearity are smaller than 1.80.  
 For a robustness check, we ran supplementary statistical models that illustrate how our 
independent variables explain mainly the individuals’ likelihood to vote EU exit in a referendum 
and no other general negative attitudes toward the EU. We used the first three control variables 
– EU attachment, attitudes toward European unification and trust in the European Parliament – 
as dependent variables for Model 1 (pooled) in Appendix 2. The results indicate that the model 
presented in this paper (with the EU exit vote as dependent variable) has a much better fit and 
 
the independent variables have considerably higher effects and statistical significance. For 
example, the model with EU attachment as dependent variable has a model fit of 0.01, while only 
three variables have an effect and are statistically significant.  
 
Analysis and Results 
Figure 1 includes the distribution of respondents who would vote to leave the EU across the 10 
East European countries included in this analysis. The last bar in the figure is the average for the 
entire region. The distribution indicates great variation in terms of desire to leave the EU, which 
ranges from roughly 5% in Poland to more than 25% in Czechia. The average of all countries is 
around 14%. Poland and Hungary are at the lower end of the spectrum, which contrasts with the 
recent discourse of political elites in these countries regarding the EU. The data indicate that the 
population in both countries support EU membership and a potential referendum would be 
unsuccessful.  
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
Overall, an EU exit referendum would be unsuccessful in any East European country because 
even those with the highest percentage of supporters for leave are in the minority compared to 
those who wish to remain. The three cases selected for the country-level comparative analysis 
reflect different levels of desire to leave the EU: Hungary is at the lower end, Bulgaria is 
somewhere in the middle, while Czechia is the country with the highest number of leavers. 
The bivariate correlations in Table 1 distinguish between the pooled model that accounts 
for all 10 countries and the three countries compared in this article. At pooled level, there is 
empirical support for almost all hypothesized relationships. There is a positive correlation, 
statistically significant at the 0.01 level, between an EU exit vote and each of the independent 
variables. Among the latter, low political interest, the absence of influence in politics, 
conservatism oriented against gay people, and limited number of social activities correlate the 
lowest. The anti-migrant attitude correlates the highest among the main effects (0.22).  
 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
In line with previous research, the controls reflecting the anti-EU feelings are highly correlated 
with the desire to exit the EU. The East European respondents who do not feel attached to the 
EU, believe that the unification has gone too far, and do not trust the EP vote to leave the EU 
more than the others. Lower educated people are overall slightly more inclined to leave the EU, 
education correlates weakly (-0.06). 
The effects on the EU exit vote in Eastern Europe are presented in Figure 2 and Appendix 
2. The graph includes two models: one without the controls (Model 1) and one with the controls 
(Model 2). Model 1 provides empirical support for six out of the eight hypothesized effects. The 
findings illustrate that all variables for conservative values (H5 and H6) and social isolation (H7 
and H8) have a statistically significant effect on a potential vote for an EU exit. Some of these 
effects are stronger. For example, the respondents with a negative attitude toward immigrants 
(H5) are 1.27 times more likely than respondents who have a positive attitude toward immigrants 
to vote leave. People who are socially isolated (H8) and have limited social activities are 1.13 
times more likely to vote for an EU exit.  
There is also empirical support for one variable belonging to each of the other two 
categories of potential explanations: political interest (H1) and dissatisfaction with democracy 
(H3). However, the belief that the people have no influence in politics (H2) and dissatisfaction 
with the economy (H4) have no effect on the likelihood to cast a leave vote. In the case of 
dissatisfaction with the economy, one possible explanation for the lack of effect may be that 
citizens understood that the EU is not responsible for what goes wrong in the country’s economy. 
The positive economic trends following accession have often been considered a result of 
Europeanization. The problems encountered by many East European economies in the aftermath 
of the financial crisis appear to be decoupled from the EU.  
 Model 2 introduces the controls associated with anti-EU rhetoric, which appear to have a 
statistically significant effect on the likelihood to vote leave. For example, individuals who believe 
 
that EU unification has gone too far are 1.28 times more likely to cast a leave vote compared to 
citizens who believe that the EU can go further. Poorly educated people are also more likely to 
vote leave. Once we control for the general Eurosceptic attitudes, there is still strong empirical 
support for two hypotheses belonging to the conservative values and social isolation categories 
from the analytical framework: perception on immigration (H5) and limited social activities (H8). 
One effect goes against the hypothesis: those who feel they have no influence on politics (H2) 
are less likely to vote leave. One possible explanation for this result is that several respondents 
with anti-EU feelings perceive that people have influence on politics. One example in that 
direction is Brexit where the popular vote determined the Parliament’s decision although the 
referendum was not binding. Dissatisfaction with democracy has no effect when controlling for 
anti-EU feelings although it had a positive effect in Model 1. One explanation is that some of the 
citizens who are unhappy about democracy are also against the EU. Another variable with a 
similar change of effect is the conservative attitude toward sexual minorities (H6). When 
including the controls, this variable has a weak effect and loses statistical significance mainly 
because it is reflected in other anti-EU attitudes.  
 
Figure 2 about here 
 
Country-level effects 
The country level comparisons provide important nuances and useful insights to the general 
picture. Figure 3 depicts the effects of all models without the controls (see Appendix 2). The 
results indicate that there are several common drivers of an EU exit vote across these countries. 
Similar to the results in the general analysis above, the conservative values and the social 
isolation are the two categories of determinants that have a strong and significant effect on the 
likelihood of an EU exit in each country. The negative perception about immigration (H5) and the 
limited social activities (H8) provide the most consistent and strong effects, but the other two 
variables are often statistically significant in the hypothesized direction. In Czechia and Hungary, 
 
the first category of potential determinants (political apathy and alienation) has strong and 
statistically significant effects, but they are not always in line with the theoretical expectations.  
In addition to these common drivers there are also particular determinants that have 
contextual explanations. In Bulgaria, dissatisfaction with democracy is important for an EU exit 
vote and this observation matches what happened recently in Bulgarian politics. The population 
is increasingly dissatisfied with political institutions and politicians, which is reflected in the high 
number of protests throughout the country. This level of dissatisfaction can spill over to attitudes 
toward democracy and trigger an EU exit since the EU does not appear to solve the democratic 
problems in the country. The negative perceptions of migrants also fuel a leave EU vote, but their 
effect diminishes when controlling for general anti-EU feelings (Appendix 2). In Czechia, people 
who are dissatisfied with the economy (H4) are likely to cast a leave vote. Another strong effect 
goes against the hypothesized relationship: people with low interest in politics (H1) are less likely 
to cast such a vote. One possible explanation for which the Czechs who are interested in politics 
are more willing to vote leave is the development of critical attitudes toward the EU based on 
information. Czechia has had for a long time one of the highest numbers of critics towards the 
EU, which remains a topic of debate in the political arena. Interested citizens are exposed to such 
debates and thus likely to adopt a position based on their content.  
In Hungary, the people who believe they have no influence on politics (H2) are less likely 
to cast a vote to leave the EU. One possible explanation is that over the last decade Hungarians 
could observe how their vote was translated into decision-making. For example, Fidesz, the 
governing party since 2010, introduced many reforms backed by a large share of the population. 
Another example is how the 2016 referendum against the EU quota for refugees determined a 
particular course of action for the country.  
 




This article aimed to explain why citizens in East European Member States would vote to leave 
the EU in the case of a referendum. The results indicate that conservative attitudes and social 
isolation are important determinants of an EU exit vote in Eastern Europe both in general and at 
the country level. Some of these observations hold also when controlling for broader anti-EU 
attitudes and education. This means that these specific categories of factors have an effect 
beyond the general determinants of Euroscepticism. To strengthen this idea, other variables such 
as low political interest or dissatisfaction with democracy may also be conducive to an EU exit 
vote. In addition to these observations, the comparison between countries shows that specific 
variables could influence a potential EU exit vote according to the domestic political dynamics. 
Another important finding is that the political alienation and dissatisfaction with the 
economy have no effect on an EU exit vote. Citizens do not wish to leave the EU because they 
feel powerless in the decision-making process or because they blame the EU for the domestic 
economic situation. As such, this specific form of Euroscepticism is not rooted in the distance 
between the citizens and politics or in a punitive attitudes as illustrated by previous research for 
other forms of Euroscepticism.  
 The study has two relevant implications for the broader field of Euroscepticism. At a 
theoretical level, it proposes an analytical framework that can explain a strong form of 
Euroscepticism associated with an EU exit vote. This framework includes political and social 
attitudes that are not traditionally linked to the EU. The results show that many of these influence 
an exit vote at either a pooled or country level. The explanatory power of this analytical 
framework is appropriate for country comparisons and it is improved within country-specific 
contexts. This framework could be developed further in studies aiming to explain similar strong 
Eurosceptic attitudes. At an empirical level, the finding that citizens are driven by different factors 
across countries is important. This means that the EU faces specific challenges across political 
settings. Since the EU is more contested by political elites in some East European Member States 
that in others, these elites may target some of the attitudes that favor this form of strong 
Euroscepticism.  
 
 Further research can take the discussion in the direction of explaining in detail the causal 
relationships. This article identifies several potential sources of an EU exit vote but does not 
explain how these may work. Such an explanation requires different types of data, which can be 
collected with semi-structured interviews, focus-groups or experiments. These can investigate 
what people consider to be the essence of such a vote and how they see the interplay between 
the domestic and European levels. Future research could also empirically test the extent to which 
the variables used in our analysis explain the specific and strong forms of Euroscepticism 
investigated in this article as opposed to other forms of Euroscepticism. A comparative analysis 
would use a separate design that has the different forms of Euroscepticism as dependent 
variables and several sets of general and specific explanations as independent variables. Another 
venue for research could be a comparison between the old and the new Member States in terms 
of these determinants. Such a comparison could test for additional variables that may mediate 
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Table 1: Correlation coefficients for the EU exit vote 
 Pooled Bulgaria Czechia Hungary 
Low political interest 0.04** -0.06* 0.02 0.02 
No influence on politics 0.07** 0.05* 0.18** -0.10** 
Dissatisfaction with democracy 0.13** 0.24** 0.17** -0.06* 
Dissatisfaction with economy 0.10** 0.16** 0.19** -0.06* 
Immigrants are bad 0.22** 0.18** 0.32** 0.19** 
Gays cannot live free 0.07** 0.09** 0.13** 0.05 
People are unfair 0.09** 0.05 0.13** 0.17** 
Limited social activities 0.07** 0.05 0.13** 0.15** 
EU attachment 0.20** 0.27** 0.17** 0.14** 
Unification too far 0.32** 0.26** 0.47** 0.32** 
Trust EP 0.28** 0.29** 0.35** 0.25** 






Note:  Correlation coefficients are non-parametric (Spearman) 




Appendix 1: Variable measurement codebook 
 Question Coding 
EU Exit vote Would you vote for [country] to remain a member of the European Union or to 
leave the European Union? 
Remain (0) 
Leave (1) 
Low political interest How interested would you say you are in politics? Very (1) 
Not at all (4) 
No influence on politics How much would you say that the political system in [country] allows people like 
you to have an influence on politics? 
A great deal (1) 
Not at all (5) 
Dissatisfaction with democracy On the whole, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in [country]?  
Extremely satisfied (0) 
Extremely dissatisfied (10) 
Dissatisfaction with economy On the whole, how satisfied are you with the present state of the economy in 
[country]? 
Immigrants are bad Is [country] made a worse or a better place to live by people coming to live here 
from other countries? 
Better place (0) 
Worse place (10) 
Gays cannot live free Gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish Agree strongly (1)  
Disagree strongly (5) 
People are unfair Do you think that most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the 
chance, or would they try to be fair? 
Try to be fair (0) 
Try to take advantage (10) 
Limited social activities Compared to other people of your age, how often would you say you take part in 
social activities? 
Much more than most (1) 
Much less than most (5) 
EU attachment How emotionally attached do you feel to Europe? Very (0), not at all (10) 
Unification too far Now thinking about the European Union, some say European unification should go 
further. Others say it has already gone too far. What is your position? 
Should go further (0) 
Has gone too far (10) 
Trust EP Please tell me how much you personally trust the European Parliament? Completely (0) 
Not at all (10) 
Education What is the highest level of education you have successfully completed? Less than lower secondary 






Appendix 2: The binary logistic regressions for an EU exit vote 
 Pooled Bulgaria Czechia Hungary 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Low political interest 1.08* 1.03 0.87 0.94 0.73** 0.84* 1.25* 1.14 
No influence on politics 1.01 0.91* 0.99 0.94 1.38** 1.18* 0.60** 0.62** 
Dissatisfaction with democracy 1.09** 0.99 1.42** 1.22** 1.03 0.96 0.96 0.96 
Dissatisfaction with economy 1.03 0.99 0.97 0.89 1.16** 1.13** 0.95 0.90 
Immigrants are bad 1.27** 1.14** 1.12** 1.03 1.39** 1.18** 1.31** 1.14* 
Gays cannot live free 1.04* 0.97 1.03 0.97 1.08 0.98 0.99 0.87* 
People are unfair 1.05** 1.01 0.98 0.89* 1.06 1.01 1.30** 1.23** 
Limited social activities 1.13** 1.07* 0.99 1.05 1.24** 1.10 1.42** 1.28* 
EU attachment  1.15**  1.23**  1.10**  1.15** 
Unification too far  1.28**  1.17**  1.45**  1.31** 
Trust EP  1.25**  1.24**  1.14**  1.30** 
Education  0.91**  1.08  0.84**  0.76** 
N 10,490 9,684 1,026 898 1,748 1,668 1,234 1,169 
Pseudo R2 0.08 0.21 0.09 0.19 0.14 0.27 0.15 0.30 
Log likelihood -3962.64 -3119.88 -380.49 -295.90 -844.32 -678.40 -383.84 -301.61 
Note:  Coefficients are odds-ratios 
** p<0.01; * p<0.05
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